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Since the days when the newly developing railroads found them-
selves unable to complete projected construction within the limits of
original finances or estimates, the roads have found it necessary to
obtain relief from the demands of creditors.1 The procedure first
utilized was voluntary' or involuntary ' distribution of rolling stock
and other assets among creditors. This crude method, and the resultant
disruption of traffic, could not long continue once communities became
dependent on rail transportation. Sensing the public inconvenience
resulting from piece-meal seizure, and the inequitable effect upon
creditors, a Georgia equity court, in 1845, directed, at the instance of
the carrier, sale of a line as a whole, free of existing liens and claims,
with distribution of the proceeds among creditors.' For the reasons
which, in 1845 motivated this Georgia court, insolvent railroads have
typically been reorganized, rather than liquidated or dismembered,5
T A. B., 1942, LL. B., 1946, Columbia University; Member, New York Bar;
Author, Corporate Mortgage Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L. J. 595 (1948).
J. Cf. RiEGEL, THE STORY OF THE WESTERN RAILROADS 22-31 (1926).
2. Cf. MARSHALL, SANTA FE 73 (1945).
3. It was such a seizure that an assignee sought to contest in Bowen v. Lease, 5
Hill 221 (N. Y. 1843) ; see 1 SwAi-E, THE CRAVATH F m 33 (1946).
4. Macon & Western R. R. v. Parker, 9 Ga. 377 (1851) (Lumkin, 3.) upholding
the decree against collateral attack. Glenn, The Basis of Federal Receivership, 25
COL. L. REv. 434, 441 (1925).
5. For eleven years following an 1867 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act [14
STAT. 535, § 37], liquidation was available in the federal courts on the petition of a cred-
itor [e. g., Sweatt v. Boston, H. & E. R. R., 23 Fed. Cas. 530, No. 13,684 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1871) ; New Orleans, Spanish Fort R. R. v. Delarmare, 114 U. S. 501 (1885)].
This provision was repealed in 1878 [20 STAT. 99 (1878)] and, for reasons similar to
those that motivated the Georgia court, this unavailability of liquidation under federal
bankruptcy law has continued, 30 STAT. 547 (1898) (§ 4 by implication) ; In re Phila-
delphia & Lewes Transportation Co., 114 Fed. 403 (E. D. Pa. 1902) ; 36 STAT. 839
(1910) (§3 expressly) ; 47 STAT. 47 (1932) (expressly) ; 11 U. S. C. §22(a) (1940).
The eleven year availability of bankruptcy liquidation did not deter continued use of
the receivership procedure. E. g., Bill v. New Albany & Salem R. R., 3 Fed. Cas. 379,
No. 1,407 (C. C. D. Ind. 1870) ; Allen v. Dallas & Wichita R. R., 1 Fed. Cas. 465, No.
221 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1878).
Bankruptcy liquidation has continuously been available to other utilities with a
question, still existing, as to the distinction between a street railway and a railroad.
In re Columbia Ry. Gas & Electric Co., 24 F. 2d 828 (E. D. S. C. 1928), aff'd, 27 F.
2d 52 (C. C. A. 4th 1928) with which compare In re Grafton Gas & Electric Co., 253
Fed. 668 (N. D. W. Va. 1918).
(793)
794 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
reorganization taking place under judicial, and at a later date, com-
mission supervision. Thus developed the progenitor of corporate re-
organization in America.'
These reorganizations long took the form of equity receiverships.
In the nineteen-twenties, however, there developed growing criticism
of these receiverships, largely because of the almost complete sub-
version in the proceedings of the policy of § 20a of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, 7 contemplating ICC authorization for all new railroad secu-
rity issues. Subsequent to enactment of that statute securities could be
issued by a solvent road only after Commission application and author-
ization. However, in order to obtain authorization for issuance of the
securities required to consummate a plan evolved in a railroad re-
ceivership, application was made to the Commission only as final
phases of reorganization approached, and after the plan had been
accepted by security-holder committees and passed upon by the court.
Though the Commission never refused to grant the authorization
sought,' it protested that such delayed presentation made contemplative
consideration impossible, since denial of an application would throw
on the Commission the responsibility for ensuing reorganization delay.'
The Commission pointed out that its participation, since 1920, in rail-
road reorganizations, while all that the statute allowed, made little
real contribution to the formulation of satisfactory plans and resultant
capital structures. 10
This protest was buttressed by suggestions of contemporary
abuses in equity receiverships," ample evidence of lack of success of
certain recent railroad receiverships," the contemporary financial
debacle, and fears of further railroad financial difficulties. The com-
bination of such factors led to the enactment, in the closing days of the
6. See First National Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 515, n. 7 (1934) ; FINLET-
TER, THE LAw OF BAN K pTCY REORGANIZATION 1-2 (1939).
7. 41 STAT. 494, § 20a (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20a (1940).
8. See Jacobs, The Interstate Commerce Commission and Interstate Railroad Re-
organizations, 45 HARv. L. REv. 855, 876 (1932).
9. See Investigation of Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 131 I. C. C. 615, 671-672 (1928);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Reorganization, 131 I. C. C. 673, 695-696, 699 (1928).
10. See Jacobs, supra note 8, at 868 et seq.; IIIA SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION 577-613 (1935).
11. See Stone, J., dissenting in United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R.,
282 U. S. 311, 331 (1931).
12. Of the 17 class I roads which went through receivership subsequent to the
1920 enactment of § 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act (Statistical Analysis of 31
Reorganizations of Class I Railways 1914-1933, inclusive, ICC Bur. of Statistics,
Table I) seven had sought RFC loans within eight months of the creation of that
agency. MOODY'S RAILROADS lxxxviii (1932).
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Hoover administration, of § 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.13
There was an immediate rush to utilize § 77: six class I roads filed
petitions within six months of enactment." There was some indica-
tion,15 soon supported by a Supreme Court admonition,1" that § 77 pro-
ceedings would be rapid. Subsequent events proved otherwise.
THE SCHEME OF SECTION 77
Under § 77,17 an interstate railroad, or creditors holding at least
five per cent of the indebtedness of the road, may file, in the proper
federal district court, a petition asserting insolvency of the road or an
inability to meet debts as they mature and the desire to effect a plan
of reorganization. The petition, when approved, gives the court exclu-
sive custody of the debtor road and its property, wherever located.'"
A hearing is then ordered at which a trustee for the debtor is ap-
pointed. 9
Within six months after filing, or within such extended time
periods as are granted by the court, the debtor is required to file a
reorganization plan, and then public hearings on the plan are held by
the Commission. Creditors, stockholders and other parties in inter-
est are, under prescribed conditions, entitled to file plans.2" Follow-
ing the hearings, the Commission may render a report approving a
13. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933) ; see Rodgers and Groom, Reorganizdtion of Railroad
Corporations ituier Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 CoL. L. REv. 571 (1933) ;
Weiner, Reorganization Under Section 77: A Comment, 33 COL. L. Rnv. 834 (1933) ;
Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, 47 HAnv. L. REv. 18 (1933); Dodd,
Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What, 48 HAnv. L. REv. 1100
(1935).
14. Of these, the Chicago & E. I., the Missouri Pacific, and the St. Louis, San
Francisco had gone through equity receiverships between 1916 and 1922, the plan of
the Chicago & E. L 'having been before the ICC on a § 20a application. See In the
Matter of Chicago & E. I. Ry., 67 I. C. C. 61 (1921).
15. See Rodgers and Groom, supra, note 13 at 591-592; Hearings before Com-
inittee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 264-265 (1935) (herein-
after cited as Hearings on H. R. 6249).
16. See Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R.,
294 U. S. 648, 685 (1935). In proposing amendments to the statute in 1935 the
draftsmen sought to ameliorate this urgency. See Hearings on H. R. 6249 at 16, 22,
25 (1935) ; Craven and Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law,
49 HARv. L. Rv. 1254, 1262-1265 (1936).
17. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references to § 77'are to the section as
presently amended, 49 STAT. 911 (1935) as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 205 (1943).
18. § 77(a).
19. § 77(c) (1).
20. § 77(d).
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plan, which may be different from any plan theretofore proposed. This
approved plan is then certified to the bankruptcy court.2 Hearings are
held by that body, at which objections to the certified plan may be
presented. If the court finds that statutory requirements have been
met, it may then approve the plan 22 and direct the Commission to
submit it to security holders for their vote.2 3 The results of balloting
are certified to the court, which may confirm the plan if two-thirds of
each voting class indicate acceptance, although it possesses, in appro-
priate circumstances, power to confirm the plan even if prescribed
percentages have not accepted.24 When confirmed, the plan is, subject
to appeal, binding on the debtor, its creditors and its stockholders.
2 5
EQUITY RECEIVERSHIP
Enactment of § 77 did not abolish the railroad receivership. Since
the collapse of 1929, fourteen Class I roads have been in receivership:
seven of these proceedings, all instituted prior to efiactment of § 77,
were completed in equity; 26 five of the fourteen transferred to § 77; 27
four of these having been instituted prior to enactment of § 77; two
remain uncompleted.2"
In authorizing the issuance of securities called for by plans
formulated in equity, the Commission did not raise any substantial
question as to the propriety of the plans, which necessarily lacked
the intimate commission participation contemplated by § 77. How-
ever, in one case the Commission broke precedent and refused to grant
the authorization sought.29 Authorization was eventually given after
modification of the plan,3" the Commission even then indicating that
21. Ibid.
22. § 77(e) first paragraph.
23. Ibid second paragraph.
24. Ibid third paragraph.
25. § 77(f).
26. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R.; Missouri & North Ark. Ry.; Mobile & Ohio
R. R.; Norfolk-Southern Ry.; Pittsburgh, Shawmut & Northern R. R.; Seaboard Air-
line Ry. and Wabash R. R.
27. Central of Ga. Ry.; Florida East Coast Ry.; Rutland R. R.; St. Louis, S. F.
Ry. and Wisconsin Central Ry., the Rutland proceedings having been instituted sub-
sequent to enactment of § 77.
28. Georgia & Florida R. R. and Missouri & Ark. Ry.
29. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Reorganization, 240 I. C. C. 57 (1940).
30. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Reorganization, 244 I. C. C. 357 (1941).
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it was not completely satisfied with the proposal.3' Subsequently
there was developed a procedure whereby application was made to the
Commission for its indication whether securities proposed in the plan
would receive § 20a authorization. Favorable indication took the form
of a conditional authorization." Then followed another application
for final authority.3" By this procedure a serious pre-1933 objection to
railroad equity receivership was met.
Section 77 did not expressly preclude railroad reorganization in
equity proceedings and, indeed, certain provisions of § 77 seemed to
recognize its continued existence. 4 The courts, however, have been
reluctant to continue, or encourage, railroad reorganization in equity
proceedings. There is some belief that § 77 contemplates that the Com-
mission shall have an intimate part in the formulation of all reorgan-
ization plans, and that the formalism of receivership reorganization
should be abolished. On such grounds, one court dismissed an equity
proceeding, 5 indicating such a proceeding must be dismissed on filing
of a petition meeting the requirements of § 77, and may be dismissed
sua sponte if the proceeding was instituted after enactment of § 77.
In another proceeding, it was indicated that § 77 evidenced implied
abolition of use of the equity receivership as an initial means to
accomplish railroad reorganization.38 As the latter court put it, the
equity receivership was "outmoded but not outlawed." 17 However,
this court allowed consummation of the receivership plan on the
ground that relegation to § 77 and reopening of the reorganization
would be undesirable because of attendant delays.
31. Id. at 387.
32. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Receivership, 257 I. C. C. 683 (1944); Wabash Ry.
Receivership, 247 I. C. C. 581 (1941).
33. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 261 I. C. C. 689 (1946); Wabash Ry., 252 I. C. C.
611 (1942). For an explan~ation of the procedure followed in the Wabash proceeding
see SEN. REP. No. 25, pt. 6, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1939). The procedure adopted
a suggestion made in 1928 in Investigation of Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 131 I. C. C.
615, 672 (1928).
34. §77(g) (court empowered to dismiss §77 proceedings if there "is undue
delay"); § 77(i); § 77(n) (preference accorded personal injury claims in "equity
receiverships of railroad corporations now or hereafter pending") ; § 77(p) (regula-
tion of committee, proxy and deposit procedure). See also INT. REV. CoDE § 142 (tax
returns) ; id. § 1808(e) (3) (stamp taxes).
35. New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R. R., 143 F. 2d 179 (C. C. A. 2d
1944).
36. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 53 F. Supp. 672,
697-700 (E. D. Va. 1943), aff'd., 145 F. 2d 40, 50-51 (C. C. A. 4th 1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 797 (1945).
37. See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 53 F. Supp.
672, 697 (E. D. Va. 1943).
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CHAPTER XV AND "VOLUNTARY ADjUSTMENTS" 
388
In the late thirties some roads, not then in bankruptcy or receiver-
ship, were unable to meet impending interest payments or maturity
dates. This resulted from either the recession of 1937-38 39 or from
prolonged inability to meet fixed charges." For these roads, bank
38.
A. Under Chandler Ac
(enacted 7/28/39,
Expired 7/31/40)
*Baltimore & 0. R. R
*Lehigh V. R. R.
Wichita F. & S. Ry.
Montana, W. & S. R.
Chicago, M. & G. R.
Peoria & E. Ry.
B. Under McLaughlin A
(enacted 10/16/42,
expired 11/1/45)
*Colorado & S. Ry.
*Midland V. Ry.
*Delavare & H. R. R.
*Baltimore & 0. R. R.
Chapter XV "Voluntary Adjustments"
Pla,
ICC Order
**230 I. C. C. 243 (11/38) 29 F.
(D. M
denied
(1940
**230 I. C. C. 685 (3/39) 34 F.
(D. P
*221 I. C. C. 585 (7/37) 30 F.
(N. I
cert. £
U. S.
R. **236 I. C. C. 325 (12/39) 32 F.
(D. A
R. 239 I. C. C. 263 (3/40) Not r
239 I. C. C. 303 (3/40) 34 F.
(S.D
xct
**254 I. C. C. 47 (8/42) CCH
ff 54,3(
254 I. C. C. 271 (3/43) 51 F.
(E. D
254 I. C. C. 239 (3/43) 51 F.
(S. D
261 I. C.C. 51 (3/45) 63 F.
(D.M
denied
871 (
i Approved General
by Court Elements
in Plan***
Supp.608 134AB
{d. 1939), cert.
i 309 U. S. 654
Supp. 753 1AB
?a. 1940)
Supp. 750 1
). Tex. 1939),
tenied, 309
687 (1940)
Supp. 200 24
tlont. 1940)
eported 1 3
Supp. 332
N. Y. 1940) 2 D
Bankr. Dec. 1 34 A
13 (D. Colo. 1943)
Supp. 180 13 A B C
Okla. 1943)
Supp. 763 2ABC
. N. Y. 1943)
Supp. 542
fd. 1945), cert.
, 328 U. S. "
1946) 14ABD
*Class I Road.
**Plan initiated prior to enactment of statute.
***General elements in plan (not necessarily applicable to all classes affected by
plan) :
Modifications of bondholders' claims:
1. extension of principal or interest obligation.
2. extension of portion of principal obligation.
3. reduction of interest.
4. interest made partly contingent.
Modifications of stockholders' interests:
A. restriction on use of income for dividend payments.
B. establishment or enlargement of sinking fund.
C. additional collateral made available as security for bonds.
D. bondholders given representation on the board.
39. See In re Lehigh Valley R. R., 34 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
40. See In re Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 29 F. Supp. 608, 615-616 (D. Md. 1939).
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loans were unavailable and refunding operations could not be success-
fully carried out.
In such cases, attempts could be made, with bondholders' consent,
to extend maturing bonds and reduce interest or to adopt some alter-
native method of readjusting maturities and debt structure.41 This,
however, would require full satisfaction of contractual obligations to
non-assenting bondholders. For two roads 42 this was a real obstacle
and as a result of their initiative, Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy
Act 43 was first enacted in 1939."4
Congressional reports on the bills that resulted in the new chapter
expressly recognized that it was not to be an amendment or sub-
stitute for § 77.45 The enactment was to be available only to roads
temporarily unable to meet their debts, whose general earning capacity
had not been so impaired as to require the more thorough reorganiza-
tion and modification of debt structure available under § 77.46
Under Chapter XV an embarrassed road, having prepared a plan
for the adjustment of its obligations, and having secured assurance
of the acceptance of the plan from creditors holding twenty-five per
cent of all claims to be affected, would present the plan to the ICC.
After making prescribed findings, 47 the Commission could then author-
ize the modifications sought and the issuance of new securities proposed
41. In 1940 the ICC approved a plan whereby the Boston & Maine R. R. ex-
changed some of its bonds, thereby extending maturities and reducing fixed charges.
Boston & Maine R. R., 240 I. C. C. 499, 511 (1940). See Hearings before Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce on H. R. 7121, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 52 (1942)
(hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on H. R. 7121).
42. The Baltimore & Ohio R. R. and the Lehigh Valley R. R.
43. 53 STAT. 1134 (1939) (Chandler Act). See Will, Chapter XV of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 7 U. OF CmI. L. REv. 203 (1940); Will, The Voluntary Adjustnient of
Railroad Obligations, 7 LAW & CONTE P. PROB. 519 (1940).
44. See In re Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 34 F. Supp. 154, 159 (D. Md. 1940);
Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on H. R. 5407, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 48-49, 51, 54, 102, 107, 185 (1939) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on
H. R. 5704) ; Senate Hearings on H. R. 7121 at 21; 84th CONG. REc. 6262 (1939).
45. H. R. REP,. No. 358, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1939) ; SEN. REP. No. 489, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939). To meet a suggestion that Chapter XV decisions might
subsequently be applicable to § 77 the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce did advance amendments which, it felt, would assure that Chapter XV
decisions would not constitute precedents under § 77. In doing so, it stated that "It is
not the intention of these amendments to make inapplicable the principles of [the Boyd
rule] . . ." Id. at 7.
46. 53 STAT. 1134, 1135, § 710(2) (1939). See In re Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 29 F.
Supp. 608, 612 (D. Md. 1939).
47. The Commission was required to find that (a) the carrier was not in need of
§ 77 reorganization and inability to meet its debts was expected to be only temporary
and (b) in the light of probable prospective earnings the plan (i) was in the public
interest, in the best interest of each class of creditor and stockholder, was feasible,
financially advisable, and not likely to be followed by insolvency or reorganization or
further adjustment, (ii) provided fixed charges which could be adequately covered by
probable earnings and left adequate means for future financing and (iii) was consistent
with adequate maintenance of property and proper performance of the railroads' obliga-
tions to the public as a common carrier. 53 STAT. 1134, 1135 § 710(2) (1939).
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in the plan.4" Armed with the assent of two-thirds of the creditors
holding claims affected by the plan, including at least a majority of
each affected class, the road could then petition the federal district
court for an order approving the plan, alleging that it was unable to
meet its debt, matured or about to mature.49 Thereupon a three-judge
statutory court would be convened 5 and, on notice to all persons in
interest,5 a hearing held. Following this, the court, after making
prescribed findings," could approve and confirm the plan, 3 as filed, or
with such modifications as the court might propose. This would then
be binding on all creditors holding claims or securities affected by the
plan, 4 and the need for purchasing the securities of non-assenters
eliminated.
Under the 1939 statute, jurisdiction of the federal court to ap-
prove Chapter XV plans expired July 31, 1940 except as to petitions
then pending.55 Under it, six readjustments were proposed and com-
pleted, two of which involved Class I roads."6
Although this enactment, and related hearings and reports, pre-
ceded the Supreme Court decision in the Los Angeles Lumber case,57
there seemed to be unanimous agreement that the statute would not
conflict with, or modify, requirements of absolute priority.5" As the
Congressional reports put it, court approval would not be granted
where stockholders' participation continued "at the sacrifice of sub-
stantive rights of creditors." "
48. 53 STAT. 1134, 1135 §710(1),(2) (1939).
49. Id. § 710(3).
50. Id. § 713.
51. Id. §720.
52. In addition to such formal findings as the existence of the requisite assents at
the time of filing and submission of the plan and amounts of fees and expenses [id.
§ 725(1),(2),(4-6)], the court was required to make, independently, the same findings
required of the Commission [see note 47 supra] and the further finding "that the plan
is fair and equitable as an adjustment, affords due recognition to the rights of each
class of creditors and stockholders and fair consideration to each class thereof adversely
affected, and will conform to the law of the land regarding the participation of the
various classes of creditors and stockholders: . . .". Id. § 725(3).
53. Id. § 721.
54. Id. § 725.
55. Id. § 755.
56. See note 38 supra, part A.
57. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939) (reversal of order
approving § 77B plan allocating some of new securities to stockholder when claims
of secured creditor exceeded valuation of property undergoing reorganization).
58. See Hearings before Cont nittee on Judiciary on H. R. 5407, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 46, 55, 83 (1939) (hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H. R. 5407) ; Senate
Hearings on H. R. 5407, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 83, 94 (1939) ; H. R. REP. No. 358,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939) ; SEN. REP. No. 489. 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939).
But cf. Senate Hearings on H. R. 5407 at 45-46 (testimony of A. A. Berle, Jr., who
viewed Chapter XV as a composition statute).
59. H. R. REP. No. 358, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939) ; see Senate Hearings on
H. R. 5407, 189 (letter of Commissioner Eastman to Senator Wheeler).
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That all plans effectuated conformed to that prediction is more
than doubtful. In at least three cases there was modification of con-
tractual rights of secured creditors with no alteration of stockholders'
interests.60 Other plans made use of such procedures or devices as
restrictions on the use of income for dividends, establishment or en-
largement of sinking funds, production of additional collateral security
and bondholders' representation on the board." In these cases, deter-
mination as to whether holders of a particular security received ade-
quate treatment could be a difficult task.62
In 1942, Chapter XV was re-enacted 11 supposedly at the request
of a holding Company 64 which, having failed to meet fixed charges
for several years, was unable to conduct refunding operations.6 5 Under
the 1942 statute four readjustments of Class I roads were proposed
and completed.66 In the course of re-enactment it was again recognized
that absolute priority applied to Chapter XV proceedings 7 " However,
only subsequent to re-enactment did it finally become clear that the
Commission had no obligation to determine fairness of the plan as
60. Wichita F. & S. Ry.; Montana, W. & S. R. R.; and Chicago, M. & G. R. R.,
cited note 38 supra. In the first two cases the plan originated as a conventional ex-
tension agreement which would not be binding on non-assenters. Since sufficient bond-
holders did not consent to make the plan financially feasible, the management used the
assents to support a Chapter XV proposal which would be binding on non-assenters.
In the third case the carrier applied to extend its first mortgage bonds for twenty-two
years and to reduce interest by two per cent. No opposition to the management plan
appeared in the last two cases.
61. See note 38 supra, last column.
62. For detailed analysis of the effect of the second Baltimore & Ohio plan
upon holders of 42, 1960 convertible bonds, see Brief for Petitioner (pp. 12-22)
Philipps v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 328 U. S. 871 (1945).
63. 56 STAT. 787 (1942) (McLaughlin Act). See also note 38 supra.
64. This was the Delaware & Hudson Co. See Senate Hearings on H. R. 7121
at 79, 83, 93. The Baltimore & Ohio R. R. was actively interested in securing enact-
ment [Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on RFC loan to
Baltimore & 0. R. R., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 131, 143-144, 146, 150, 502, 747-748,
750 (1947)], an interest which was intentionally not disclosed. Id at 751.
The corporation for which Chapter XV was ostensibly reenacted, the Delaware
& Hudson Co., was not a "carrier" as defined in § 20 (a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act [41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20(a) (1940)], but rather a non-carrier,
liable or obligated on the securities of a carrier. As such, it would not come within
the provisions of § 77 or the 1939 version of Chapter XV. But for a special provision
in the 1942 version of Chapter XV [56 STAT. 787, 789 § 711, 11 U. S. C. § 1211 (Supp.
1942) ] it could have only utilized Chapter X to effect a reorganization. Senate Hear-
ings on H. R. 7121 at 93; Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary on H. R.
6840, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-35 (1942) (hereinafter cited as House Hearings on
H. R. 6840).
65. See Delaware & Hudson R. R., 254 I. C. C. 239, 243 (1943).
66. See note 38 supra, part B. The 1942 statute expired November 1, 1945, fol-
lowing unsuccessful attempts to extend its life. H. R. 3429; H. R. REP. No. 1128;
91 CONG. Ruc. 10,276 [all 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)].
67. House Hearings on H. R. 6840 at 14, 38, 39; H. R. REP. No. 2177 at 5; SEN.
REP. No. 1617 at 5; but see Senate Hearings on H. R. 7121 at 10-11 [All 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942)].
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among security holders."5 In this respect, adjustments under Chapter
XV differ greatly from § 77 proceedings, where in the first instance,
and before the plan is presented to the court, the ICC approves the
entire plan, and also differ from larger Chapter X reorganizations
where the SEC renders an advisory report to the court including its
views as to compliance with priority requirements. That this militates
against development of "fair and equitable" Chapter XV plans is
reasonably clear, for, as one shrewd judge pointed out, the three-judge
court, passing on Chapter XV plans, is not immune from the influences
associated with Commission-authorized plans, already accepted by
two-thirds of all affected creditors. 9 Nor is this the only aspect of
compulsion. Rejection of the plan will precipitate § 77 proceedings,7"
and modification of the plan might increase the cost of already costly
solicitation and acceptance.71 These compulsive pressures on the three-
judge statutory court are not unlike those which, heretofore, con-
fronted receivership courts in considering reorganization plans that
resulted from long and costly negotiation and study.7"
So long as § 77 reorganization is deemed a spectre, and to the
extent that a court composed of three local federal judges feels that
"continued successful operation [of a regional railroad] . . . is a mat-
ter of vital concern not only to the holders of hundreds of millions of
its bonds but also for the public interest and convenience", 7" judicial
scrutiny of a Commission-authorized Chapter XV plan "independ-
ently of the extent of acceptance . . and of any lack of opposition
• . . and of the fact that the Commission. . . has authorized the...
68. See Midland V. R. R., 254 I. C. C. 271, 281, 282 (1943); Delaware & H.
R. R., 254 I. C. C. 239, 240 241, (1943) ; cf. dissent in Mondtana, W. & S. R. R., 236
I. C. C. 325, 338, 339 (1939).
69. See L. Hand, J. in Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 34 F. Supp. 332, 338 (S. D. N. Y.
1940). While the Commission never failed to authorize a Chapter XV proposal, there
was occasional dissent, e. g., on the ground that the proposal did not sufficiently extend
maturities [Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 261 I. C. C. 51, 90 (1945)], that the applicant
was not in merely temporary financial difficulty [Montana, W. & S. R. R., 236 I. C. C.
325, 337 (1939)], or that it needed reorganization rather than a mere "adjustment"
[Chicago, M. & G. R. R., 239 I. C. C. 263, 279 (1940)].
70. See It re Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 63 F. Supp. 542, 545, 546, 551, 554, 560
(D. Md. 1945); In re Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 29 F. Supp 608, 619, 627 (D. Md.
1939); It re Lehigh Valley R. R., 34 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E. D. Pa. 1940); In re
Montana, W. & S. R. R., 32 F. Supp. 200, 202 (D. Mont. 1940). Under some circum-
stances a Chapter XV petition might have been rejected on the ground that § 77 should
have been utilized. Cf. SEC v. U. S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434
(1940); New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R. R., 143 F. 2d 179 (C. C. A.
2d 1944).
71. When the 1938 Baltimore & Ohio plan was submitted to the court the com-
pany had incurred expenses of $600,000. See It re Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,.29 F.
Supp. 608, 629 (D. Md. 1939).
72. See discussion supra.
73. See It re Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 63 F. Supp. 542, 547 (D. Md. 1945).
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modification of securities as proposed... -,4 seems little more than
a pious hope.75
REORGANIZATION UNDER § 77
Proceedings have been instituted under § 77 on behalf of twenty-
five class I roads. Fifteen proceedings have been completed," one
has been dismissed 17 and nine remain uncompleted. 8  Since § 77 has,
for the last decade and a half, been the principal vehicle for railroad
reorganization, review of its procedures and operation in some detail,
and at least a glance at the results, is not out of place.
1. Filing and Approval of Petition; Appointment of Trustee
Section 77 is available not only to interstate railroads but to those
roads which, while having property in but one state, handle traffic
and equipment a considerable part of which is in interstate move-
ment.7" Roads which render suburban or interurban service are rele-
gated to Chapter X unless more than fifty per cent of operating rev-
enues are derived from transportation of freight in standard steam
railroad freight equipment. s°
After approval of the petition, an early act of the reorganization
court is the appointment of one or more trustees of the debtor's prop-
erty."' Under § 77 as originally enacted the courts could, and did,
appoint former officers of the debtor as trustees. This was deemed
desirable to maintain continuity in management and operation."
74. 53 STAT. 1134, §725(3) (1939); 56 STAT. 787, §725(3) (1942).
75. This is particularly significant under Chapter XV, for while the plan was
considered by a three-judge court convened pursuant to § 266 of the Urgent Defi-
ciencies Act, 43 STAT. 936, 938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1940), unlike other pro-
ceedings brought before such a court, there was no appeal to the Supreme Court as of
right, the only recourse being application for certiorari which was always denied. See
note 38 supra. No review may be had before a circuit court of appeals. Ackert v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 115 F. 2d 455 (C. C. A. 4th 1940) cert. denied smb norn.
Harvard State Bank v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 311 U. S. 717 (1941).
76. Akron, C. & Y. Ry.; Alton R. R.; Chicago & E. I. Ry.; Chicago & N. W.
Ry.; Chicago G. W. R. R.; Chicago I. & L. Ry.; Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R. R.;
Chicago R. I. & Pac. Ry.; Denver & R. G. W. R. R.; Erie R. R.; Minn. St. P. & S.
Ste. M. Ry.; New York, N. H. & H. R. R.; St. Louis, S. F. Ry.; Spokane Inter-
national Ry.; Western Pac. R. R.
77. St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
78. Central of Ga. Ry.; Central R. R. of N. J.; Duluth, 8. S. & At. Ry.; Florida
East Coast Ry.; Missouri Pac. Ry.; N. Y., 0. & W. Ry.; N. Y., S. & W. R. R.;
Rutland R. R.; Wisconsin Central Ry.
79. § 77(m).
80. In re Chicago, N. S. & M. R. Co., 131 F. 2d 458 (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
81. § 77(c) (1).
82. See Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 51, 109 (1935). Prior to the 1935 revision it was held that appointment of a
trustee was not required and operation of the property could be left in the control of
the existing management, subject to court supervision. Lansdown v. Faris, 66 F. 2d
939 (C. C. A. 8th 1933).
804 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
But, as it was also felt this might perpetuate the conditions which
brought about insolvency, the statute was amended to require that,
on appointment of a former officer as trustee, there be appointed a co-
trustee without such prior affiliation."
2. Jurisdiction of the Reorganization Court
Operation of the road is continued by the trustee under general
and special instructions of the court. In so far as operations affect the
public, ICC jurisdiction is respected, 4 and even where ICC jurisdic-
tion is not immediately involved, the court may hold hearings to deter-
mine public sentiment.8 5
Creditors are greatly affected by the operational policies of the
road while undergoing reorganization, possibly even more directly
than by operational policies of a solvent road. Their participation in
the reorganized road may depend, in part, on the use made of the
property subject to their lien, and the earnings of that property during
reorganization. While abandonment of a branch line will reduce the
security value of that line to that of scrap it may also eliminate a
deficit property from a mortgage division, thereby increasing earnings
of that division 88 and increasing its possible participation in reorgan-
ization. Acquisition of new equipment may increase earnings and
income or improve competitive position,"T but if acquisition be financed
by the sale of equipment trust certificates, a priority will result 8 and
corporate debt will be increased. 9 If the equipment be purchased with
cash, working capital will be reduced, directly affecting the security
83. § 77(c) (1).
84. A district court may authorize discontinuance of service only after the Com-
mission has issued the order required by § 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act [41
STAT. 477 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1(18) (1940)] has been made by the ICC. Thompson
v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U. S. 134 (1946) (suit to enforce, on lessee-debtor, lessor's
termination of lease); it re Boston Terminal Co., 71 F. Supp. 472 (D. Mass. 1947)
(petition of mortgage trustee to foreclose).
85. Cf. In re Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 32 F. Supp. 244 (D. Colo. 1940) (petition
of trustee to abandon branch line; plenary court hearing held prior to ICC application).
86. Cf. In re Central, of Ga. Ry., 42 F. Supp. 940 (S. D. Ga. 1942).
87. Cf. Van Schaick v. McCarthy, 116 F. 2d 987 (C. C. A. 10th 1941) (petition
of trustee to use accumulated cash for installation of traffic control equipment).
88. § 77(j).
89. Ilt re St. Louis, S. W. Ry., 17 F. Supp. 68 (D. Mo. 1936), aff'd. sub nora.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Henwood, 88 F. 2d 163 (CCA 8th 1937) (objection to trustee's
motion, seeking authority to use accumulated cash for construction of new equipment
and urging, instead, the sale of equipment trust certificates, overruled) ; cf. In re
Denver & R. G. W. P. R., 47 F. Supp. 484 (D. Colo. 1942), appeal dismissed on consent,
142 F. 2d 451 (C. C. A. 10th 1944) (creditors objection to use of accumulated cash for
payment of bankruptcy obligations overruled).
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of any creditors having a lien on accumulated earnings." Thus, dur-
ing the course of a § 77 proceeding, the court is constantly confronted
with interrelated operational, financial and legal questions.
Since the objective of a § 77 proceeding is to effect a "fair and
equitable" plan of reorganization, the court, in making each decision,
must consider the contribution or detraction each decision will make
to an ultimate plan. In like manner, before allowing a secured creditor
to pursue or exercise his contractual rights unhampered, the court will
consider the effect of such exercise and will enjoin whatever will
adversely affect formulation of a plan."
The "property" of the debtor which, with related liens, may be
subjected to the power of the reorganization court, is an enlarging con-
cept. The court may direct that apropriate steps be taken to bring
into the proceeding a solvent, partly-owned subsidiary; "2 or a solvent
lessor of property operated by the debtor; " and it would seem that the
court possesses some power to prevent those who are neither creditors,
nor claimants, from taking steps which would tend to disrupt or impede
reorganization. 4  So broad is the power of the court that only a
specific provision of § 77 '5 protects those having interests in rolling
stock, operated on the debtor's lines pursuant to a lease or conditional
sale, from receiving treatment similar to that accorded ordinary secured
creditors. 96
3. Claims; Filing of Plan
The category of "claims" which may be dealt with by a § 77 plan
is large. It includes obligations of the debtor under operating agree-
90. Cf. It re Wisconsin Central Ry., 64 F. Supp. 251 (D. Minn. 1946), aff'd
sum 1wm. Empire Trust Co. v. United States Trust Co., 165 F. 2d 829 (C. C. A. 8th
1948).
91. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648
(1935) (exercise of power to sell pledged collateral enjoined). If the enjoined
creditor be injured by a decrease in value of the pledged collateral he will be entitled
to assert a claim, as a secured creditor, to the extent of his damage. It re New York,
N. H. & H. R. R., 147 F. 2d 40, 47-48 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), on remand, 64 F. Supp.
487 (D. Conn. 1945).
92. See N. Y. Trust Co. v. N. Y. & GreenwoodLake Ry., 156 F. 2d 701, 703, 704
(C. C. A. 3d 1946).
93. In re Pittsburgh Ry., 155 F. 2d 477 (C. C. A. 3d 1946) ; cert. denied, sub
nora. Philadelphia Co. v. Guggenheim, 329 U. S. 731 (1946) (Chapter X) ; 60 HARV.
L. REv. 140 (1946). But cf. Benton v. Callaway, 165 F. 2d 877 (C. C. A. 5th 1948),
cert. granted March 15, 1948.
94. It re Central of Ga. Ry., 48 F. Supp. 445 .(S. D. Ga. 1942), aff'd Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Callaway, 135 F. 2d 592 (C. C. A. 5th 1943) (injunc-
tion continued against sale of stock of subsidiary in which debtor owned equity, which
stock was pledged to secure bonds on which debtor had no obligation).
95. § 77(j).
96. See Friendly, Ainendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act, 36 COL. L.
REv. 27 at 42, 43 (1936).
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ments or leases 9 7 and debts which, while not obligations of the debtor,
are secured by liens on the property of the debtor.9" These claims
may properly be treated by an offer of securities of the reorganized
company. A filed proof of claim constitutes prima facie evidence of
the claim " and the statute does not contemplate that each claimant
seek formal allowance of his claim. °0 A creditor or trustee may make
timely objection to any claim,' 0 ' but it is on the basis of the filed proofs
that plan-formulation proceeds.
Upon the corporate debtor is the obligation to file, within six
months of approval of the petition, the debtor's proposed plan.'
However, early in the administration of § 77, earnings and operations
were at such a low level that there was reluctance to prepare plans for-
mulated on the assumption that then current earnings were indicative
of the future,0 3 and time to file plans was freely extended.0 4 Some
courts even suggested that a period of operation under § 77 was neces-
sary, or desirable, to determine a basis for reorganization or future
operation1O°
4. Commission Approval of a Plan
Following hearings, the Commission is required to report on a
plan, which may be different from any plan proposed, and, indeed may
97. See In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R., 36 F. Supp. 193, 205-210 (N. D.
Ill. 1940), aff'd sub nora. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 523, 546-555 (1943). At times, reorganization of the lessor
may take place "in connection with" reorganization of the lessee, in which case the
properties may be consolidated. See Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H.
& H. R. R., 161 F. 2d 413, 420-421 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
98. In re Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 50 F. Supp. 835, 860-861 (N. D. Ill. 1943);
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Fleming, 157 F. 2d 241, 248-249 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946)
(bonds of Little Rock & Hot Springs & Western R. R.) ; In re Missouri Pac. R. R.,
39 F. Supp. 436, 445-6 (E. D. Mo. 1941) (same).
99. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U. S. 565, 573 (1947). A mortgage trustee may
file a claim for all the bonds for which it is trustee. § 77(c) (7). If it fails to do so
within a reasonable time individual bondholders may file claims. Blumgart v. St.
Louis, S. F. Ry., 94 F. 2d 712 (C. C. A. 8th 1938), cert. detied, 304 U. S. 567 (1938).
100. Cf. § 77(c) (7).
101. E. g., In re Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 63 F. Supp. 151 (D. Wis. 1945) (objection
-to claim for interest on interest accrued but unpaid during receivership and § 77 pro-
ceedings).
102. § 77(d).
103. See House Hearings on H. R. 6249, at 76, 87, 95, 280; 52 ANN. REP. ICC
11 (1938) ; Swaine, Present Status of Railroad Reorganization and Legislation Affect-
ing Thein, 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv. 161, 164 (1941); Rhyne, Work of the Interstate
Comzerce Commission in Railroad Reorganization Proceedings under Section 77, 5
GEo. WAsa. L. REv. 749, 776 (1937).
104. 48 ANN. REP. ICC 18 (1934) ; Craven and Fuller, supra note 16, at 1261 n. 25.
105. In re Central of Ga. Ry., 57 F. Supp. 419, 420 (S. D. Ga. 1944) ; it re
Central of Ga. Ry., 42 F. Supp. 940, 944, 945 (S. D. Ga. 1942). Contra: In re New
York, N. H. & H. R. R., 54 F. Supp. 595, 603 (D. Conn. 1943).
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be a plan proposed initially by the Commission, provided, in its opinion,
it meets requirements of the statute.106
(a) Extent and nature of existing claims and liens. While the
existence of claims or liens may be recognized by all, there may be dis-
pute as to their nature, extent or priority. In the past, these disputes
have frequently been initially raised at Commission hearings on the
plan. As these are largely questions of law, Commission determina-
tion of these disputes, as embraced in its plan, are regarded as "tenta-
tive" 107 and may be reviewed by the district court.' This has
resulted in duplication of effort and, where the tentative determinations
are found wrong, there ensues time-consuming shuffling between Com-
mission and court.0 9 A partial solution to this wasteful process has
developed, whereby the Commission, when aware of such disputes, ap-
proves a plan with alternative features, either one to be invoked de-
pending on subsequent judicial resolution of the dispute."0 A more
satisfactory procedure, and one coming to be used with greater fre-
quency, is for creditors or the trustee to submit the controversy to
the reorganization court in advance of, or contemporaneous with, the
Commission hearing."' This judicial determination, subject to re-
view, is then determinative of the issue.
(b) The plan and creditors. Of chief importance to credi-
tors is the treatment accorded their claims. This is dependent on the
capitalization of the reorganized road and their participation therein.
(i) Capitalization of the reorganized road. The Commission, in
approving a plan, establishes a "maximum capitalization", which, in
its opinion, the reorganized road can sustain."' This "maximum
capitalization" is then allocated among participating security holders.
Although earnings are deemed most significant in determining ap-
106. § 77(d).
107. Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 448, 489, 503 (1943).
108. Id. at 489-503; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac.
R. R., 318 U. S. 523, 568-569 (1943).
109. On remand of a plan it is not necessary for the Commission to proceed de
novo as though a plan were to be formulated for the firit time. Chicago, R. I. &
Pac. Ry. v. Fleming, 157 F. 2d 241, 245 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S.
780 (1946). The practice has developed whereby the court, in advance of approval
or disapproval, refers the plan back to the Commission for "limited purposes." In re
New York, N. H. & 1I. R. R., 147 F. 2d 40, 44, 50 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), cert. denied,
325 U. S. 884 (1945) ; In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 161 F. 2d 413, 418-419
(C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 859 (1947).
110. E. g. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorganization, 257 I. C. C. 9 (1944),
approved, In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 54 F. Supp. 631, 636-7 (D. Conn. 1944).
111. E. g., In re Central of Ga. Ry., 58 F. Supp. 807 (S. D. Ga. 1945), rev'd meb
norn. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 150 F. 2d 453 (C. C.
A. 5th 1945) ; It re Wisconsin Central Ry., 63 F. Supp. 151 (D. Minn. 1945).
112. Cf. § 77(b) (4).
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propriate capitalization,113 Commission reports on § 77 plans typically,
and somewhat illogically, recite in addition to evidence on earnings,
evidence on all the factors enumerated in the valuation provision of
§ 77 (e).114 The weight accorded earnings by the Commission in
arriving at a "maximum capitalization" is not discernable," 5 but there
is substantial reason to feel that what is accomplished is an ad hoc
determination.'1 6
113. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S. 495,
516 (1946) ; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R.,
318 U. S. 523, 540-541 (1943); cf. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312
U. S. 510, 525-526 (1941) (§ 77B proceedings). With an estimate of future earnings
it is deemed possible to establish a capitalization which a given enterprise may reason-
ably be expected to service. See Note, 51 YALE L. J. 85, 88-96 (1941). This has not
been a simple task-in railroad reorganization. Since 1930 the railroads successively
experienced full effect of the collapse of the late twenties, severe highway competition
of the early thirties, drought and dust-bowl conditions of the thirties, the recession
of 1937-38, followed by unprecedented wartime traffic and earnings. As a result, for
the years 1930-1946 annual railroad income available for charges has ranged from a
low in 1938 of $503 million to a high in 1942 of $1,618 million with an annual average
of $912 million. MOODY'S RAILROADS a6 (1947).
Of interest are the "probable future annual earnings" available for fixed charges
assumed by the Commission in some § 77 proceedings:
Actual annual earnings available for fixed charges 1940-1946**
Assumed by Annual
Road the ICC* High (year) Low (year) Average
C. & N. W. $14,625,000 $42,426,259 (1943) $11,224,665 (1940) $22,629,400
C. M. St. P. & P. 15,894,000# 52,481,624 (1943) 14,866,993 (1940) 30,007,782
C. R. I. & P. 11,000,000 37,672,445 (1943) 8,417,779 (1940) 23,648,810
N. Y., N. H. & H. 13,388,674 35,926,210 (1943) 5,616,230 (1946) 21,037,878
* See Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 2857, 78th Cong.
199 (1943).
** Moony's RALROADS 1091, 1271, 1124, 973 (1947).
# Estimate filed by a party to the Commission proceeding.
114. § 77(e), last paragraph. Following enactment, this valuation provision was
castigated as a ". . . compromise between plain good sense and supposed good
law . . .". 2 BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATON OF PROPERTY 878-881 (1937). Plans were
subsequently approved based on records containing no evidence as to reproduction cost
[Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 448, 483 (1943) ; cf. In re Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 126 F. 2d 351, 363 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 793 (1943) (mere
Commission consideration of reproduction cost is adequate statutory compliance)], and
the contention that the provision required valuation of debtor's property was rejected.
In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., 35 F. Supp. 230, 244 (N. D. Ill. 1940). One court
charitably observed that the provision was intentionally vague in order to make up-
setting of a Commission valuation difficult. See In re Western Pac. R. R., 34 F. Supp.
493, 500 (N. D. Cal. 1940).
115. But even this "maximum capitalization" is not a fixed figure for it has been
held that if, before consummation of the plan, old securities are retired, new securities
theretofore allocated to retired securities need not be distributed to the remaining
creditors but may remain unissued, or issued and retained in the treasury. In re
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 67 F. Supp. 547, 553 (N. D. Ill. 1945), aff'd sub nora.Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Fleming, 157 F. 2d 241 (C. C.'A. 7th 1946), cert. denied,
329 U. S. 780 (1946).
116. "Although it has been said that the ICC has adopted a valuation based on
earning power in capitalizing reorganized railroads, neither the language used nor the
results reached by the Commission seem to justify this conclusion." Note, 54 HARV.
L. REv. 655, 656 (1941). Cf. Frank, J. dissenting in Old Colony Bondholders v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 161 F. 2d 413, 448-450 (C. C. A. 2d 1947); Swaine,
A Decade of Railroad Reorganization uder Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Act, 56 HARV. L. Rtv. 1037, 1193, 1198-1201 (1943) ; Note, 51 YALE L. J. 85, 94-95
(1941) ; Friendly and Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities i Railroad Re-
organizations Under Section 77, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 420, 426 (1940) ; Warner,
Some Financial and Economic Problems in Railroad Recapitalizations, 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 438, 438-439 (1940).
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Section 77 plans have typically excluded stockholders from par-
ticipation in the reorganized road with the finding that their interest
is of "no value". 117  The practice has been upheld as in accord with
the statute.""
(ii) Participation of creditors in the reorganized road. The
principal problem of equity reorganizations was to prepare a plan that
would bind non-assenters. The same problem faced draftsmen of
the first federal reorganization statute. One troublesome aspect of
this was that of priority.
Long prior to the federal reorganization statutes it was held that
a reorganization that did not allow junior creditors to participate
in the reorganized company was unfair and inequitable to these credi-
tors if old stockholders were allowed to participate to an extent greater
than justified by a new contribution to the reorganized company. It
was held also that such a plan, even though consummated, did not
preclude these creditors from asserting a debt claim against the re-
organized company." 9 This standard, it has been held, was incor-
porated in some of the federal corporate reorganization statutes. 20
Before 1933 there was speculation, but little decisional law, as
to whether priority was applicable as between classes of creditors. 12 1
Speculation also revolved about what must be given to a senior class
117. § 77(e), second paragraph.
118. Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 448, 475-489 (1943) ; Reconstruction
Finance Corporation v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S. 495, 516-520 (1946).
While § 77(b) (3) clearly contemplates use of stock warrants, plans which excluded
stockholders from participation, and made no provision for the issue of warrants, have
been upheld. Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R., supra at 477, 478479, 481482; Group of
Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 523, 536-546
(1943).
119. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913); cf. Louisville Trust Co.
v. Louisville, N. & Chi. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899) (bill by unsecured creditor to
examine foreclosure proceedings); Chicago, R. I. & Pac. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392
(U. S. 1868) (suit by judgment creditor to levy on fund reserved for distribution to
stockholders of insolvent debtor); see Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union
Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445, 455 (1926).
120. § 77B, 48 STAT. 912 (1934) [Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308
U. S. 106, 115-116 (1939)] ; § 77 [Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St.
P. & Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 523, 541-542 (1943)]; Chapter X, 52 STAT. 883 (1938)'
[Marine Harbor Properties Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., et al., 317 U. S. 78, 85
(1942)]; but cf. Chapter XI, 52 STAT. 905 (1938) [SEC v. U. S. Realty & Improve-
ment Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940)].
121. See Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the
Last Decade, 27 COL. L. REv. 901, 907 (1927) (urging applicability of "the Boyd
doctrine") ; Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of
Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COL. L. REv. 127 (1928) (the
classical statement of "absolute priority" but recognizing that completed reorganizations
showed a distinct leaning toward a rule of relative income position) ; 2 BONBRIGHT,
JUDICIAL VALUATION OF PROPERTY 872-873 (1937) (urging applicability of classical
absolute priority).
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before a junior class might participate.' Not until formulation of
post-1933 reorganization plans, then unique in the capitalization re-
ductions accomplished, were these questions pointed for judicial
decision.
In 1936 the Supreme Court, in a § 77B proceeding, held that
junior creditors might be excluded when the market value of the cor-
porate assets was found to be less than the amount of the senior
claim.' 3 This exclusion of junior creditors, while analogous to
exclusion of stockholders in the Los Angeles Lumber case '4 was,
however, not a decision based on doctrinal priority, but rather on
statutory provisions empowering the court to eliminate from par-
ticipation those creditors whose claims were found to be valueless. 2 5
Similarly, in § 77 reorganizations, junior creditors, like stockholders,
may be denied participation if the Commission finds the junior claims
are of "no value" 126 or, more realistically, that the approved "maxi-
mum capitalization" will be exhausted in allocations to the seniors.
(iii) Allocating new securities to secured claims. Secured claims
that have participated in consummated plans fall into two general
categories: (1) those secured by liens on operating property and (2)
those secured by pledges of collateral.
Participation by claims secured by liens on operating property
has generally been based on earnings of the liened property. Thus,
claims secured by a senior lien on a very profitable division have, by
some plans, been left undisturbed. 2 At the other end of the scale,
claims secured by a senior lien on a weak division, or by a junior
lien on a division with earnings scarcely equal to the amount neces-
sary to meet interest on the senior lien have, by some plans, been al-
loted securities having a total face, par or stated value considerably
less than the claim, and are subject to exclusion from participation
122. Cf. Bonbright and Bergerman, supra note 121, at 131 (advocating the alloca-
tion of ". . . new securities whose fair [cash market] value is estimated or roughly
equal to the par of the principal plus defaulted interest.").
123. In re 620 Church Street Corp., 299 U. S. 24 (1936) ; accord, It re Witherbee
Court Corp., 88 F. 2d 251 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert. denied sub twin. Klee Corp. v.
Roosevelt, 301 U. S. 701 (1937).
124. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939) (§ 77B).
125. § 77(b) (4) ; (e) (1).
126. Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 448, 475-476 (1943) (unsecured
creditors) ; see Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S.
495, 509 (1946) ; Swaine, supra note 116 at 1212-1213.
127. Cf. Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 448, 476, 483, 488 (1943).
128. E. g., in the New Haven reorganization, left undisturbed were the Harlem
River & Port Chester R. R. 4's, 1954, Naugatuck R. R. 1st 4's, 1954, and the Provi-
dence Terminal 1st 4's, 1956.
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if the Commission finds the claim, because of its remote chance to
participate in earnings, of "no value". 129
Participation by a collaterally secured claim, most of which have
been RFC held, has usually been based on value of the collateral.'
Claims secured by pledge of collateral consisting of debtor's securities
having a market value in excess of the claim have been paid the full
amount of the claim in cash, 1' or alloted securities having a cash value
substantially equivalent to the claim.'3 2  Where the claim is secured
by collateral having a lesser market value it has been alloted securi-
ties that would have been allocated to the collateral, 13 the unsatisfied
portion being regarded as an unsecured claim.
Claims well secured by pledged collateral were generally created
when open-market sale of railroad bonds was possible only at sub-
stantial discounts. Their chief object was to facilitate the making of
secured loans without the necessity of creating a new bond issue for
129. See note 125 .supra. The text is addressed to a situation where one property
is the bnly security for two mortgages, a situation which, because of its simplicity, is
not common in Class I reorganizations. More common are overlapping liens on
contiguous or non-contiguous properties where one mortgage may be a first lien on
a western division and a junior lien on parts of an eastern division. § 77 plans have
sought to eliminate such lien complexities by creating system mortgages. In doing
this some appropriate formula must be used to determine the contribution made to the
system mortgage by release of the lien of the old divisional mortgage and to establish
an appropriate basis for allocating new system securities to old lienors. See Con-
solidated Rock Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 520-525 (1941).
130. The old Erie General Convertible 4's, 1953, in addition to being a junior
lien on the Erie System, were secured by pledge of the stock of six companies, the
stock of two being recognized as of value, the others being regarded as valueless. The
court approved the plan over the objection of the Convertibles that the plan failed to
allocate sufficient fixed interest bonds to them. The allocation was based on the
Commission's appraisal of the assets of the companies whose stock was pledged. In. re
Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 248-251 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
131. The Milwaukee plan, as finally approved by the Commission, provided cash
payment for the collaterally secured RFC claim. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R_
Reorganization, 254 ICC 707 (1943).
132. In the Chicago & N. W. reorganization, the RFC had a claim of $49,184,905
which was secured by the pledge of collateral having a face value of $101,813,800. For
this, it was allotted a note and new securities, described in note 135 infra, having a
face value of $83,701,008. See In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., 35 F. Supp. 230, 241-243,
259 (N. D. Ill. 1940), aff'd, 126 F. 2d 351, 369-370 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), cert. denied,
318 U. S. 793 (1943).
133. The Western Pacific plan as approved by the Commission treated three
collaterally secured claims as follows:
Ratio
(collateral: total
Collateral* New Securities collateral) (allocation:
Creditor Total Claim (face amount) (total allocation) total allocation)
RFC $3,862,870 $10,750,000 $1,063,693 1:1.767
RCC 2,590,924 4,000,000 395,792 1:4.749
A. C. James 6,249,750 4,249,000 420,480 1:4.470
$12,703,544 $18,999,000 $1,879,965
* Collateral consisted of Western Pac. R. R. Gen. & Ref. Bonds which were a
first lien on property found, by the Commission, to have a value and earning power
sufficient to justify issue of the allocated securities. See 318 U. S. at 456 (1943).
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sale at such a discount." 4 The treatment accorded such a claim seems
inconsistent with the treatment frequently accorded the bond secured
by a senior lien on a profitable line. That bond is frequently alloted
new securities which, while they have a face value equal to the face
amount of the claim of the bond, have a lesser cash market value.3 5
The difference in treatment makes the well collateralized claim a safer
and more desirable security, in § 77 proceedings, than a mortgage
bond. Though a junior creditor may object to a plan on the ground
that it fails to meet standards of fairness, in that it accords unduly
favorable treatment to other participants, 8 the apparent conflict in
treatment nevertheless continues unexplained, chiefly because the al-
location accorded the well collateralized claim has been generally un-
opposed. In a similar manner, senior lienors have accepted without
protest allocations of new securities having a total face value equal to
the old claim, although selling at a discount. They have not objected
to these allocations,' although junior participation is based, in part,
on property subject to the senior lien. 38 As a result, while language
134. See Hatch, A Form of Depression Finance-Corporations Pledging Their
Own Bonds, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1093, 1093-1096, 1111 (1934). The mortgages of
recently reorganized roads deter recreation of such generbusly secured claims. These
mortgages contain covenants that the mortgagor will not pledge the bonds so that
they exceed debt secured by such a pledge by more than ten per cent of the total
bonds issued. E. g., First Mortgage, Denver & R. G. W. R. R., Art. IX, § 21 (1947).
135. In the Chicago & N. W. reorganization the RFC held a collaterally secured
claim of $49,184,905. For this it received a $25,000,000, 15 year secured serial note
of the reorganized company. Treating this note as the equivalent of cash, the alloca-
tion of the $24,184,905 residuum of the claim, as compared with allocations made to
the 1st and Ref. Bonds, was as follows:
Face, par or stated value of new
securities allocated for each:
$1,170 of residual 1st & Ref. Bond having
Allocated Securities RFC claim a total claim of $1,170
1st & Gen. Bonds $376.52 $153.00
2nd Mtge. Income Bonds 586.07 231.50
5% Pfd. ($100 par) 751.95 304.50
Common (at $100 stated value) 1,125.31 481.00
$2,839.85 $1,170.00*
* Market value of these securities, as of May 17, 1947, was $484.46. See Hearings
before Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 249, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 453 (1947).
136. See Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 329 U. S. 607,
618 (1947).
137. Thus, the only objections on behalf of creditors to the Milwaukee and Denver
plans as approved by the Commission were those of trustees of the bond issues that
received the smallest allocation. The seniors, apparently, did not urge that permitting
these junior issues to participate was an act of benevolence. Cf. Swaine, supra note
116, at 1210.
138. In the Milwaukee proceeding it was held that the 50 Year Mortgage 5's had
a second lien on lines west of the Missouri River and a third lien on lines to the east
and that the Convertible Adjustment 5's were secured by a still inferior lien on the
same properties. The Fifty Year bonds received for their $1195 claim securities
having, on consummation day, a market value of only $870. Nevertheless, the Adjust-
ment 5's were allotted common stock.
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of § 77 cases accords lip service to application of "absolute priority"
among classes of creditors, actual results are otherwise.139
As recently as 1937, the principal advocate of "absolute priority"
recognized it as a standard of elementary land mortgage law not then
fully recognized in corporate reorganization.140  One aspect of the plea
that it be recognized in the reorganization field was accepted in the
form of denial of stockholder participation where such participation
would result in what was deemed inadequate allocation to creditors.
In sharp contrast to this acceptance is the failure to apply a similar
standard among ranks of creditors. Since the standard was originally
urged as appropriate for the recognition of creditors' rights, the failure
of senior creditors to insist on its application in recent railroad re-
organizations, and their acceptance of allocations less than those justi-
fied by the standard, may indicate permanent eclipse in corporate
reorganization of "absolute priority" among classes of creditors.
5. Court Approval of the Plan
On other than legal aspects of the plan, Commission determina-
tions are conclusive if the Commission report indicates consideration
of some evidence material to its determinations, and at least some of
the evidence supports that determination.' 4 ' If requirements of the
139. As did Prof. Bonbright and Mr. Bergerman, the following table assumes
that the market value of the new securities provides one means of analyzing the fair-
ness of the allocations of a consummated reorganization plan.
Total Claim per Total New Face and Market Value
Old Security $1,000 Bond* Par Received of New SecuritiesApr. 15, 1947
Denver & R. G. W. 
R. R.
Rio G. W. 1st Trust 4's $1320 $1320 $1022
Rio G. W. Consol. 4's 1330 1330 443
Rio G. Junct. 1st 5's 1379 1379 1084
Denver & R. G. Consol. 4 's 1340 1340 535
Denver & R. G. Consol. 4Y's 1382 1382 552
Ref. & Imp. 5's 1412 1412 462
Ref. & Imp. 6's 1495 1495 489
General 5's 1461 146 14
Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
May 17,1947
1st & Ref. 4'A's 1161 1161 $484
Chicago, G. W. R. R.
1st 4's 1959 1143 1144 420
Minn. St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry.
1st Consol. 5's 1133 1147 302
Western Pac. R. R.
1st 5's 1946 1267 1266 1013
* Less any cash allocated.
140. See 2 BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 121, at 867-870.
141. Ecker v. Western Pacific R. R., 318 U. S. 448, 466-477 (1943); Chicago,
R. I. & Pac. R. R. v. Fleming et al., 157 F. 2d 241, 244 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U. S. 780 (1946). Subsequent to the Western Pacific and Milwaukee
decisions it was suggested that Commission determination might be conclusive only
upon questions "strictly of public interest." Swaine, supra note 111, at 1049-1051.
Later decisions indicate that the district court has no greater power of review over
questions not "strictly of public interest." In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 147 F.
2d 40, 46 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 884 (1945) (Commission finding
that equity of stockholders has no value, relative allotment to two participating
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statute have been met, court approval follows." Under such limited
review it has been futile to urge that the security structure adopted
by the Commission fails to reflect an appropriate capitalization.
143
6. Balloting; Confirmation and Consummation
Following court approval, the plan is submitted by the Com-
mission to security holders for their vote.144  Submission need not
be made to classes excluded from participation, nor to those classes
of creditors whose interest the Commission, and court, have found will
not be adversely and materially affected by the plan. Submission to
stockholders is required in only a few circumstances and has rarely
been necessary. If the requisite vote is obtained, confirmation is
automatic.
1 45
Though there is generally a lapse of time between court approval
and balloting, if the court were asked immediately upon approval of
a plan to confirm it over the objections of non-assenters, there would
be "a re-examination of the plan to assure that those who dissent have
had fair and equitable treatment . . . [and re-examination would]
center upon the rights of those who rejected the plan." 146 Since the
Supreme Court has indicated that "the elements which make the plan
fair and equitable cannot be the basis for reasonably justified rejec-
tion," 4 it would seem that this supposed immediate re-examination
would necessarily be directed, not to elements of the plan, but rather
to such obsolescence of presuppositions and assumptions as are brought
about by changed conditions.1
48
classes); In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 54 F. Supp. 595, 604-605 (D. Conn.
1943) (relative allotment to two participating classes.
142. "... the District Court acts concerning the plans only upon the issues
specifically delegated by subsection (e). As to these, its powers are negative. It may
veto the plan in its entirety but may improve it only by suggestion." Ecker v. Western
Pacific R. R., 318 U. S. 448, 474 (1943).
143. E. g., Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pic. R. R.,
318 U. S. 523, 544-545 (1943), where the court rejected the argument that the pro-
portion of stock in the capital structure, with a concomitant loss of tax saving in the
form of interest deductions, justified upsetting the plan. Some flexibility is preserved
in the plan by including a provision empowering the court to "cure defects and supply
any omission or reconcile any inconsistency." In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R.,
36 F. Supp. 193, 214-216 (D. Ill. 1940).
144. § 77(e), third paragraph.
145. Ibid.
146. See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S.
495, 534 (1946).
147. Id. at 535; In re Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 160 F. 2d 942, 945 (C. C. A.
7th 1947). This exclusionary rule, it has been noted, gives no independent status to
the "reasonable rejection" test [Frankfurter, 3. dissenting in Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., note 146 supra at 545, 548; Swaine, supra note 116,
at 1054], a result justifiable for administrative reasons. 60 HARv. L. Rxv. 211, 293
(1946).
148. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S. 495,
535 (1946); In re Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 160 F. 2d 942, 945-949 (C. C. A.
7th 1947).
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7. Changed Conditions
It is recognized that the courts possess the power to stay con-
summation of reorganization plans because of changed conditions.149
In recent years, numerous attempts have been made to stay consum-
mation of § 77 plans on the ground that increased earnings, subsequent
to Commission approval, constituted "changed conditions" justifying
a stay. These attempts have uniformly been unsuccessful, chiefly be-
cause what was asserted as "changed conditions" was regarded as too
temporary in nature to be accorded significance, and was usually found
to have been contemplated, envisaged, and considered by the Commis-
sion when it approved the plan.'
8. Dismissal of Proceedings
Section 77 was originally regarded as a means of accomplishing
reorganization somewhat more rapidly '5 than through use of the
equity receivership, 5 and the suggestion has been made that the
statute is not to be regarded as a moratorium statute.153  At the time
149. Swaine, supra note 116, at 1221-1224 and inferentially by the cases cited
note 150 infra. Cf. Knight v. Wertheim & Co., 158 F. 2d 838 (C. C. A. 2d 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 818 (1947).
150. Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 329 U. S. 607,
611-621, 627 (1947) (appeal from Circuit Court order staying consummation); Re-
construction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S. 495, 520-524
(1946) (appeal from order of confirmation); Ecker v. Western Pacific R. R., 318
U. S. 448, 506-509 (1943) (appeal from order of approval); In re Chicago, R. I.
& Pac. R. R., 160 F. 2d 942, 947-949 (C. C. A. 7th 1947) (order refusing to confirm
and remanding with instructions, vacated); In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 147
F. 2d 40, 45-46 (C. C. A. 2d 1945) (appeal from order of approval). In the Missouri
Pacific proceeding the Commission, in response to a request of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, stated that in its view the retirement of debt with
resultant release of new securities, extensive expenditures for improvements and large
cash accumulations subsequent to its October 1944 report justified further Commission
review of the plan. In September 1947 that Court vacated the District Court order
of approval and directed that the plan be returned to the Commission "for its further
investigation, consideration and recommendation." Wright v. Group of Institutional
Investors, 163 F. 2d 1022 (C. C. A. 8th 1947).
A procedure, which may become the exclusive procedure for urging reconsidera-
tion of a § 77 plan on the ground of "changed conditions," is that contained in P. L.
478, 80th Congress, for obtaining Commission reconsideration of certified plans (id.
§3).
151. See discussion supra.
152. Railroad receiverships during the period 1870-1897 were of an average dura-
tion of two to three years. Swain, Economic Aspects of Railroad Receivership, 3 J.
Am. EcoN. Ass'N 53, 104 (1898). The 225 railroad receiverships that took place in
the period 1898-1931 were of an average duration of four years, five months. 2 DEwING,
THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1321 n. ccc (1941) ;cf. Rodgers and Groom,
mipra note 13, at 571 n. 1. The average time consumed in § 77 proceedings of class I
roads up to June 1, 1948 is as follows:
14 proceedings instituted under § 77 and completed .................. 9 yrs., 1 mo.
5 proceedings instituted under § 77 but not yet completed .......... 11 yrs., 6 mo.
1 proceeding transferred from equity to § 77 and completed ........ 13 yrs., 7 mo.
4 proceedings transferred from equity to § 77 but not yet completed.. 5 yrs., 3 mo.
153. Craven and Fuller, supra note 16, at 1263. See Group of Institutional In-
vestors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 523, 545 (1943) ; In re Chicago,
R. I. & Pac. Ry., 72 F. 2d 443, 452 (C. C. A. 7th 1934). But see Lowden v. Northern
Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 298 U. S. 160, 164 (1936).
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§ 77 petitions were filed in large numbers, there was no suggestion
that the proceedings would be used as a means of securing a mora-
torium.' But that very thing was accomplished in at least one in-
stance.1 55 To the extent that § 77 is regarded as a vehicle for reducing
railroad capitalization "5 and fixed charges, this objective is defeated
by dismissal of the proceedings.
RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS'RELATING TO SECTION 77
Stockholders and junior creditors who were excluded from par-
ticipating in roads reorganized under § 77 have been vocal in express-
ing dissatisfaction with the statute. Beginning in 1943, juniors
sought to amend § 77 so as to nullify those holdings of the Western
Pacific and Milwaukee cases recognizing prospective future earnings
as the primary basis for determining capitalization of the reorganized
road. They sought to establish seemingly arbitrary levels below which
capitalization could not be reduced. 5 '
When this proposal failed to pass the Senate, juniors sought
enactment of a bill which would require that court control of roads
undergoing § 77 reorganization be surrendered to the debtor if aver-
age annual earnings for seven preceding years were adequate to meet
fixed charges. The debtor would then be given the opportunity for
"readjustment of its financial structure as in the light of present...
circumstances may be consistent with sound financial practice." 158
This proposal, when introduced, contemplated that readjustment would
be of the Chapter XV form, heretofore described, or by voluntary
agreement or extension. Thus would be provided an escape from
much of the restriction of priority. There was a flurry of other bills 19
154. A petition so filed might be subject to dismissal for not having been filed in
"good faith." See In re Realty Associates Securities Corp., 163 F. 2d 387, 391 (C. C.
A. 2d 1947).
155. The St. Lods, Southwestern proceedings were dismissed July 24, 1947. Cf.
Boston Terminal Co. v. Mutual Savings Bank Group Committee, 127 F. 2d 707 (C. C.
A. 1st 1942). A similar result has been accomplished under Chapter X, e. g., In re
Realty Associates Securities Corp., 163 F.'2d 387, 390-391 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
156. See discussion supra.
157. This was the objective of the Hobbs Bills of the 78th Congress. [H. R. 2857
and H. R. 4960; Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary of H. R. 2857;
H. R. REP. No. 1615 (1944)] and the 79th Congress [H. R. 37; H. R. REP. No. 48].
158. This was the objective of the Reed Bill of the 79th Congress H. R. 4779 and,
H. R. 5924, Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 4779, H. R.
REP. No. 1838.
159. (a) The Wheeler Bill of the 79th Congress [S. 1253 as reported with amend-
ments April 11, 1946; SEN. REP. No. 1170; Hearings before Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1253, 135 et seq. (1946); H. R. REP. No.
26911 ; (b) the Reed-Myers Bill of the 80th Congress [Hearings before Senate Coln-
mittee ot Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 249; SEN. REP. No. 432 (parts 1
and 2)]; and (c) the Reed Bill of the 80th Congress [H. R. 3237 and H. R. 3980;
Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 3237; H. R. REP. No. 923
(parts 1 and 2)].
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with multiple objectives but whose certain result would be effective
curtailment of § 77 as a railroad reorganization statute.160 Seemingly,
inspiration for these latter measures stemmed largely from Chapter
XV which, when enacted, was thought to be so limited that it could
not affect § 77. Failure of enactment of these bills at a time when rail-
road earnings were at a peak engenders the feeling that the general
pattern of § 77 will remain.' 6'
SECTION 77 AND DILIGENT REORGANIZATION
Other than the objections of juniors, the chief criticism of § 77
is the delay in accomplishing reorganization. Some of this delay is
understandable. For the same reasons that state legislatures enacted
moratorium and stay laws, the ICC did not push plans when earnings
were at a low level. It would have been impolitic for senior creditors
to have urged speed at this stage, and juniors had every interest in
securing delay. In addition, the most serious legal problems of the
statute were not conclusively answered until the Supreme Court deci-
sions of March 1943. Thus, unheeded went the early admonition of
that Court, that" . . .those who institute the [§ 77] proceeding and
those who carry it forward . . . [are] bound to exercise the highest
degree of diligence .... 162
Much of the delay subsequent to the late thirties may be attributed
to the reorganization scheme contemplated by the statute. Although
corporate reorganization developed in America exclusively as a func-
tion of the courts, it was long recognized that it might be delegated
by statute to an administrative agency, with recourse to the courts
only to determine compliance with statutory standards.'63 While § 77
160. None of the bills cited in notes 157-159 mipra had ICC support. In the
midst of the flurry there was introduced, at the request of the ICC, a bill supposedly
to enable solvent roads to eliminate the "threat of financial difficulties" and thus avoid
§ 77 reorganization. For an analysis of this proposal, see Billyou, Corporate Mortgage
Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L. J. 595 (1948). The Commission proposal
led to enactment of P. L. 478, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948).
161. Contrariwise, the persistence and nature of criticism of § 77 since 1943, the
failure of the Commission or senior creditors to present a reasoned defense of the
section, and proposal by the Commission of a statute that flies in the face of present
reorganization law [see note 160 supra] may indicate that the days of § 77 are
numbered.
162. See Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.,
294 U. S. 648, 685 (1935).
163. More than half a century ago Judge Taft made such a suggestion as to
railroad reorganizations. ANN. REP., Am. BAR Ass'N 237, 264 (1895). This view
was adopted in the Bank Conservation Act of 1933 which empowers the Comptroller
of the Currency to appoint a conservator for insolvent national banks and for the
implementation, without judicial approval, of a reorganization plan approved by the
Comptroller. 48 STAT. 1 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 207 (1940). That this view is not,
likely to receive wide acceptance in the near future seems clear from the observation
made by the SEC in 1937 and 1940 that it did ". . . not believe there is any present
necessity that they [the courts] should be divested of control over and responsibility
for the administration of these [insolvent] estates by placing the functions which they
818 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
was adopted before the Roosevelt Administration took office, there was
agreement between the incoming and outgoing administrations as to the
need for a statute which would inject the ICC into the reorganization
process' 64 There were differences as to details; one was the scope
of the Commission role. A proposal that railroad reorganization be
vested exclusively in the Commission 65 did not survive to be included
in the bill which finally became § 77. In the 1935 revision of § 77,
scant attention was paid to the relative roles of court and Commis-
sion, so that their relative position today substantially reflects the
compromise of 1933.6
Briefly put, in this role the Commission, after hearings, approves
a plan which it certifies to the district court. If that court finds that
the plan conforms to statutory requirements it may approve it. Its
only alternative, save for what it may be able to do under the guise
of "curing defects, supplying omissions or reconciling inconsisten-
cies," 16' is to refuse approval and remand the plan to the Com-
mission.
6 8
In 1937, subsequent to an extensive study of protective and re-
organization committees,'6 I and again in 1940,171 the SEC, as its
studied conclusion, stated: "We do not believe that there is any pres-
ent necessity that . . . [the courts] should be divested of control over
and responsibility for the administration of these [insolvent] estates by
placing the functions which they perform in the hands of administrative
agencies. Nor do we believe such control and responsibility over these
estates should be shared by the courts and the administrative agencies.
Rather, we recommend that the powers of the courts over these estates
be broadened, that they be provided with further and more specific
standards to guide their administration of them, and that machinery
perform in the hands of administrative agencies." SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITY, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, pt. I, 898 (1937); id. pt. VIII, 336 (1940).
164. N. Y. Times, June 8, 1935, p. 25, col. 3.
165. 76 CONG. REc. 2927, 5358 (1935).
166. § 77 incorporates time-consuming provisions, included in 1933 and 1935, to
meet supposed constitutional problems. For example, it provides for court order of
approval followed by balloting by the ICC which, in turn, is followed by court order
of confirmation. This results in two court hearings involving substantially similar
questions with the right to appeal from each order. Since the decision of the Supreme
Court in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S. 495
(1946), indicating that an adverse result in balloting of security holders cannot prevent
confirmation of an approved plan, the suggestion has been made that balloting pro-
visions be eliminated from § 77, ANN. REP., C'TrEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND COPORATE
REORGANIZATION, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N. Y. 7 (1946-1947). With
balloting eliminated, a confirmation hearing would serve no useful purpose.
167. See note 143 supra.
168. See note 142 supra.
169. SEC, supra note 163, pt. I, 898.
170. Id. pt. VIII, 336.
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be designed to afford the courts the benefits of administrative assistance
in these complicated financial and business situations." In the light
of this, the § 77 pattern of allocating extensive duties to the ICC
would seem to deserve reconsideration.
Thought-provoking contrasts with the roles assigned Commission
and court by § 77, are provided by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
and § 11 of the Holding Company Act. Under Chapter X,171 enacted
in 1938, reorganization is almost exclusively judicial. The statute
provides for SEC participation in two ways: first, as a party on the
request, or with the approval, of the judge; 172 second, in the form of
the duty to render advisory reports to the judge on plans which he
deems worthy of consideration when scheduled liabilities exceed $3,-
000,000 and, when less than that sum, on the request of the judge.1'1
This participating role, wherein the SEC has no veto power over
plans, substantially reflects the recommendations made by that Com-
mission prior to the drafting of Chapter X.1'
The Holding Company Act,78 enacted one day prior to the 1935
revision of § 77, 17 providing in § 11 for approval and implementation
of plans for simplification of corporate structure, redistribution of
voting power, and reorganization of solvent companies subject to the
Act,:7 7 embraces a different commission-judiciary role. There, as to
solvent companies, the SEC may approve a plan sponsored by
security holders or proposed by the Commission. Only after SEC
approval are proceedings initiated before the court-when the SEC
seeks an order directing enforcement of, or compliance with, the ap-
proved planY.9  On entry of the order, which issues if it is found that
the plan complies with statutory standards, the plan is effective upon
the company and security holders. In the case of corporations sub-
ject to the Holding Company Act and undergoing Chapter X re-
171. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §501 et seq. (1940). Conditions deemed
relevant by the Commission in determining whether it should, of its own motion, par-
ticipate in Chapter X cases are: (1) the statutory evidence that Congress did not
desire that the SEC participate in all Chapter X proceedings, (2) the existence, in
the case, of matters of public interest and whether they alone, or with other factors
and circumstances, warrant SEC participation. Address, Samuel 0. Clark, Jr.,
Director of the Reorganization Division, SEC, Jan. 5, 1939, p. 9.
172. 11 U. S. C. § 608 (1940). However, unlike other parties, the Commission
may not appeal.
173. Id. § 572.
174. SEC, sipra note 163, pt. I, 898-901; id. pt. VIII, 336 n. 12. The SEC did
not suggest that it be deprived of the right to appeal.
175. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (1940).
176. The Holding Company Act was enacted Aug. 26, 1935.
177. 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79k(b) (1940).
178. Id. (b) and (e).
179. Id. (d) and (e).
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organization, no plan may become effective unless it receives SEC
approval.'
80
On their face, these statutes evince different policies as to the
administrative role in reorganization. Chapter X evinces a desire (a)
to make available to the courts expert and impartial assistance in
determination of the complex problems arising in the course of pro-
ceedings, or in connection with plan formulation without giving the
SEC the power to veto, or require, the adoption of any particular
plan; and (b) to assign to the SEC the duty of observing Chapter
X proceedings' 81 and to participate when it believes conditions
warrant.
As a former Director of the Reorganization Division of the SEC
put it: "Since we have been clothed with no sanctions to enforce our
findings on particular issues nor to make binding upon the courts or
the parties the conclusions expressed in our advisory reports upon
plans of reorganization, we can make our influence felt only through
the quality of the assistance and advice that we render in the proceed-
ings. In other words it is incumbent upon is to proceed with full
knowledge that from a long range viewpoint our views will find ac-
ceptance only by virtue of the inherent soundness they possess." 182 In
contrast, § 11 evinces a desire that the views of the SEC prevail in
such proceedings and in those Chapter X proceedings involving com-
panies subject to the Holding Company Act.
Despite the difference in attitude expressed by Congress in the two
statutes, Judge Frank, then Chairman of the SEC, expressed the view
that the recognition accorded SEC participation in Chapter X reorgan-
izations and the results accomplished, justified serious consideration of
the possibility of recasting the SEC § 11 role along the lines of Chapter
X.'83 These views, expressed by the SEC chairman shortly after it had
acquired experience under both statutes, deserve serious consideration.
Justification for the views expressed were that the SEC reports, which
were "advisory only," received such approbation that they were "having
an immense effect on the substantive law of corporate reorganizations."
Further, there was the decided feeling that the diligence displayed in
Chapter X proceedings was in marked contrast with that under § 11
and § 77."' No doubt, acceptance of the SEC's views of substantive
180. Id. (f).
181. This is facilitated by the Chapter X provision requiring the clerk of the court
to transmit to the SEC copies of petitions, orders and other documents filed in such
proceedings. 52 STAT. 903 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 665 (1940).
182. Clark, supra note 171 at 8.
183. Ltr. July 9, 1940, to Walter Gellhorn, Director, Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure, reproduced in SEN. Doc. No. 10, Part 13, 132-
136 (1941).
184. Id. 132-133.
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law was facilitated by a receptive judiciary. Most significarit is the
fact that on the basis of experience the SEC suggested that its § 11
prerogative, to hold hearings and to approve a plan in advance of
judicial consideration, might be surrendered without impairing statu-
tory objectives. The foregoing suggestions and the supporting reasons
are equally applicable to the ICC role in railroad reorganization. As-
suming agreement that the ICC continue to have the final word on all
matters dealing with feasibility of plans, including capital structure,
as contrasted with matters dealing with fairness,-85 this might well be
accomplished by a Commission report made at the close of court hear-
ings on proposed plans.'
It is unlikely that the well-being of any field of American cor-
porate endeavor has greater repercussions than that of the railroads.
No state or county or financial institution is isolated from the effects
of the insolvency of the roads. This is particularly true since service
deteriorates as insolvency approaches, and it is the rare case where
service or equipment attains a high standard while in reorganization.
Since 1943, revision of the railroad reorganization statute has been
much discussed in many places, particularly in the hearing and com-
mittee rooms of Congress. Much of this, unfortunately, appears to
have been misdirected. Activity has been directed chiefly to enlarging
the group of those who may participate in future reorganizations.
While this is not necessarily an undesirable endeavor, concentration
of interest along these lines has caused such dissipation of time and
effort as to defer needed revision of a statute which is today pro-
cedurally archaic. Section 77 can be effectively revised. However,
aspiring revisors should recognize that railroad reorganization involves
more than questions as to who may participate in a reorganized road
and that it is but one aspect of the greater problem of creating and
maintaining railroad systems that will adequately serve the future.
185. Cf. "It may well be that, without harm to the standards of § 77 greater speed
could be obtained if, by amendments to the Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
vis a vis the fairness of railroad reorganization plans as distinguished from their
feasibility, were assigned a role similar to that played by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in corporate reorganizations under Chapter X, i. e., as adviser to the court
and the interested parties." Frank, J., in New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland
R. R., 143 F. 2d 179, 188 n. 30 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
186. Thus, eliminated, in addition to the Commission hearing, would be the time
consumed between the Commission hearing and the ensuing court hearing, a period
which not infrequently is at least one year. Also eliminated, would be the dilatory
procedure of incorporating in the court record matters which could have been, but
were not, presented before the Commission [Cf. Comstock v. Group of Institutional
Investors, 163 F. 2d 350 (C. C. A. 8th 1947)], a procedure sharply curtained in § 11
proceedings by specific statutory provision. 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79x
(1940).
